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ABSTRACT
A private data federation is a set of autonomous databases
that share a unified query interface offering in-situ evalua-
tion of SQL queries over the union of the sensitive data of
its members. Owing to privacy concerns, these systems do
not have a trusted data collector that can see all their data
and their member databases cannot learn about individual
records of other engines. Federations currently achieve this
goal by evaluating queries obliviously using secure multi-
party computation. This hides the intermediate result car-
dinality of each query operator by exhaustively padding it.
With cascades of such operators, this padding accumulates
to a blow-up in the output size of each operator and a pro-
portional loss in query performance. Hence, existing private
data federations do not scale well to complex SQL queries
over large datasets.
We introduce Shrinkwrap, a private data federation that
offers data owners a differentially private view of the data
held by others to improve their performance over oblivious
query processing. Shrinkwrap uses computational differen-
tial privacy to minimize the padding of intermediate query
results, achieving up to 35X performance improvement over
oblivious query processing. When the query needs differ-
entially private output, Shrinkwrap provides a trade-off be-
tween result accuracy and query evaluation performance.
1. INTRODUCTION
The storage and analysis of data has seen dramatic growth
in recent years. Organizations have never valued data more
highly. Unfortunately, this newfound value has attracted
unwanted attention. Security and privacy breaches litter the
news headlines, and have engendered fear and a hesitance to
share data, even among trusted collaborators. Without data
sharing, information becomes siloed and enormous potential
analytical value is lost.
Recent work in databases and cryptography attempts to
solve the data sharing problem by introducing the private
data federation [4]. A private data federation consists of
a set of data owners who support a common relational
database schema. Each party holds a horizontal partition
(i.e., a subset of rows) of each table in the database. A pri-
vate data federation provides a SQL query interface to ana-
lysts (clients) over the union of the records held by the data
owners. Query evaluation is performed securely from multi-
ple data owners without revealing unauthorized information
to any party involved in the query without the assistance of
a trusted data curator.
A private data federation must provably ensure the fol-
lowing guarantee: a data owner should not be able to re-
construct the database (or a part of it) held by other data
owners based on the intermediate result sizes of the query
evaluation. One way to achieve this without a trusted data
curator is to use secure computation protocols, which pro-
vide a strong privacy guarantee that intermediate results
leak no information about their inputs.
Current implementations of private data federations that
use secure computation have a performance problem: state-
of-the-art systems have slowdowns of 4–6 orders of magni-
tude over non-private data federations [4, 56]. The source
of this slowdown lies in the secure computation protocols
used by private data federations that permit the secure eval-
uation of a SQL query without the need of trusted third
party. A SQL query is executed as a directed acyclic graph
of database operators. Each operator within the tree takes
one or two inputs, applies a function, and outputs its result
to the next operator. In a typical (distributed) database
engine, the execution time needed to calculate each inter-
mediate result and the size of that result leaks information
about the underlying data to curious data owners partici-
pating in the secure computation. To address this leakage,
private data federations insert dummy tuples to pad inter-
mediate results to their maximum possible size thereby en-
suring that execution time is independent of the input data.
With secure evaluation, query execution effectively runs in
the worst-case, drastically increasing its computation costs
as intermediate result sizes grow. While performance is rea-
sonable for simple queries and small workloads, performance
is untenable for complex SQL queries with multiple joins.
Several approaches attempt to solve this performance prob-
lem, but they fail to provably bound the information leaked
to a data owner. One line of research uses Trusted Exe-
cution Environments (TEEs) that evaluate relational oper-
ators within an on-chip secure hardware enclave [54, 56].
TEEs efficiently protect query execution, but they require
specialized hardware from chip manufacturers. Moreover,
current TEE implementations from both Intel and AMD
do not adequately obscure computation, allowing observers
to obtain supposedly secure data through widely publicized
hardware vulnerabilities [9, 17, 28, 31, 49]. Another ap-
proach selectively applies homomorphic encryption to evalu-
ate relational operators in query trees, while keeping the un-
derlying tuples encrypted throughout the computation (e.g.,
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CryptDB [45]). While this system improves performance, it
leaks too much information about the data, such as statistics
and memory access patterns, allowing a curious observer to
deduce information about the true values of encrypted tu-
ples [15, 26, 39, 7].
In this work, we bridge the gap between provable secure
systems with untenable performance and practical systems
with no provable guarantees on leakage using differential
privacy [14]. Differential privacy is a state-of-the-art tech-
nique to ensure privacy, and provides a provable guarantee
that one can not reconstruct records in a database based
on outputs of a differentially private algorithm. Differen-
tially private algorithms, nevertheless, permit approximate
aggregate statistics about the dataset to be revealed.
We present Shrinkwrap, a system that improves private
data federation performance by carefully relaxing the pri-
vacy guaranteed for data owners in terms of differential pri-
vacy. Instead of exhaustively padding intermediate results
to their worst-case sizes, Shrinkwrap obliviously eliminates
dummy tuples according to tunable privacy parameters, re-
ducing each intermediate cardinality to a new, differentially
private value. The differentially private intermediate re-
sult sizes are close to the true sizes, and thus, Shrinkwrap
achieves practical query performance.
To the best of our knowledge, Shrinkwrap is the first sys-
tem for private data sharing that combines differential pri-
vacy with secure computation for query performance opti-
mization. The main technical contributions in this work are:
• A query processing engine that offers controlled informa-
tion leakage with differential privacy guarantees to speed
up private data federation query processing and provides
tunable privacy parameters to control the trade-off be-
tween privacy, accuracy, and performance
• A computational differential privacy mechanism that se-
curely executes relational operators, while minimizing in-
termediate result padding of operator outputs
• A novel algorithm that optimally allocates, tracks, and
applies differential privacy across query execution
• A protocol-agnostic cost model that approximates the
large, and non-linear, computation overhead of secure
computation as it cascades up an operator tree
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we define private data federations, outline our privacy
goals and formally define secure computation and differen-
tial privacy. Section 3 describes the problem addressed by
Shrinkwrap. Our end-to-end solution, Shrinkwrap, and its
privacy guarantees, is described in Section 4. We show how
to optimize the performance of Shrinkwrap in Section 5.
Section 6 describes how we implement specific secure com-
putation protocols on top of Shrinkwrap’s protocol agnostic
design. We experimentally evaluate our system implementa-
tion over real-world medical data in Section 7. We conclude
with a survey of related work and future directions.
2. PRIVATE DATA FEDERATION
In this section, we formally define a private data feder-
ation (PDF), describe privacy goals and assumptions, and
define two security primitives – secure computation and dif-
ferential privacy.
A private data federation is a collection of autonomous
databases that share a unified query interface for offering in-
Query
Coordinator
End User
SQL 
query q
output of q
over all DBs
secure query plan q
secret shares of q’s 
output (1/data owner)
Secure Computation
Private Data 
Owner
Figure 1: Private data federation architecture
situ evaluation of SQL queries over the union of the sensitive
data of its members without revealing unauthorized infor-
mation to any party involved in the query. A private data
federation has three types of parties: 1) two or more data
owners DO1, . . . ,DOm that hold private data D1, . . . , Dm
respectively, and where all Di share a public schema of k re-
lations (R1, . . . , Rk); 2) a query coordinator that plans and
orchestrates SQL queries q on the data of the data owners;
and 3) a client that writes SQL statements to the query co-
ordinator. The set of private data D¯ = (D1, . . . , Dm) owned
by the data owners is a horizontal partition of every table
in the total data set D.
As shown in Figure 1, the client first passes an SQL state-
ment q(·) to the query coordinator, who compiles the query
into an optimized secure query plan to be executed by each
data owner. Once the data owners finish execution, they
each pass their secret share of the output to the query coor-
dinator, who assembles and returns the result to the client.
2.1 Privacy Goals and Assumptions
Table 1 summarizes the privacy goals for all parties in-
volved in this process and the necessary assumptions re-
quired for achieving these goals.
Privacy Goals: Data owners require a privacy guarantee
that the other parties (data owners, query coordinator and
the client) are not able to reconstruct the private data they
hold based on intermediate results of the query execution.
In particular, we require data owners to have a differentially
private view over the inputs of other data owners (formally
defined in Def. 2). We aim to support two policies for clients.
Clients may be trusted (output policy 1) and allowed to
see true answers to queries but must not learn any other
information about the private inputs held by data owners.
Clients may be untrusted (output policy 2), in which case
they only are permitted a differentially private view over the
inputs. The query coordinator is an extension of the client
and has the same privacy requirements.
Assumptions: To achieve the privacy goals presented above,
a private data federation assumes that all parties are com-
putationally bounded and work in the semi-honest setting.
Hence, the query coordinator honestly follows the protocols
and creates a secure plan to evaluate the query. All parties
faithfully execute the cryptographic protocol created by the
query coordinator, but may attempt to infer properties of
private inputs held by other parties by observing the query
instruction traces and data access patterns. The query co-
ordinator is also assumed to be memory-less as it destroys
its contents after sending query results back to the client.
When the client/query coordinator sees the true answers
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Table 1: Privacy Goals and Assumptions
(output policy 1), we assume that the client/query coordi-
nator is trusted to not collude with data owners; otherwise,
if the client/query coordinator shares the true answer with
a data owner (or publishes the true answer), the data owner
who colludes with the client/query coordinator can use his
own private data and the true query answer to infer the in-
put of other data owners. Similarly, we assume the data
owners do not share their true input with the client/query
coordinator; otherwise, the client/query coordinator can in-
fer the other data owners’ input and gain more information
than the query answer. When the client/query coordinator
is not trusted, we assume that the client may collude with
(as many as all but one) data owners. Our guarantees hold
even in that extreme case.
2.2 Security Primitives
Secure Computation: To securely compute functions on
distributed data owned by multiple parties, secure compu-
tation primitives are required. Let f : Dm → Rm be a
functionality1 over D¯ = (D1, . . . , Dm) ∈ Dm, where fi(D¯)
denotes the i-th element of q(D¯). Let Π be an m-party
protocol for computing f and VIEWΠi (D¯) be the view of
the i-th party during an execution of Π on D¯. For I =
{i1, . . . , it} ⊆ [m], we let DI = (Di1 , . . . , Dit), fI(D¯) =
(qi1(D¯), . . . , qit(D¯)), and VIEW
Π
I (D¯) = (I,VIEW
Π
i1(D¯), . . . ,
VIEWΠi1(D¯)). We define secure computation with respect to
semi-honest behavior [19] as follows.
Definition 1 (secure computation). We say m-party
protocol securely computes f : Dm → Rm if there exists a
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm denoted S and negl(κ)
such that for any non-uniform probabilistic polynomial ad-
versary A and for every I ⊆ [m], every polynomial p(·),
every sufficiently large κ ∈ N, every Dˆ ∈ Dm of size at most
p(κ), it holds that
|Pr[A(S(I,DI , fI(D¯)), f(D¯)) = 1]− (1)
Pr[A(VIEWΠI (D¯),OUTPUT
Π(D¯)) = 1]| ≤ negl(κ),
where negl(κ) refers to any function that is o(κ−c), for all
constants c and OUTPUTΠ(D¯) denotes the output sequence
of all parities during the execution represented in VIEWΠI (D¯).
Various cryptographic protocols that enable secure compu-
tation have been studied [5, 10, 11, 18, 46, 33, 52, 55] and
several are applicable to relational operators [4, 8, 50].
1Functionality f can be both deterministic or randomized
Differential Privacy: Differential privacy [14] is an ap-
pealing choice to bound the information leakage on the in-
dividual records in the input while allowing multiple releases
of statistics about the data. This privacy notion is utilized
by numerous organizations, including the US Census Bu-
reau [34], Google [16], and Uber [27]. Formally, differential
privacy is defined as follows.
Definition 2 ((, δ)-Differential Privacy (DP)). A
randomized mechanism f : D → R satisfies (, δ)-differential
privacy if for any pair of neighboring databases D,D′ ∈ D
such that D and D′ differ by adding or removing a row and
any set O ⊆ R,
Pr[f(D) ∈ O] ≤ e Pr[f(D′) ∈ O] + δ. (2)
The differential privacy guarantee degrades gracefully when
invoked multiple times. In the simplest form, the overall pri-
vacy loss of multiple differentially private mechanisms can
be bounded with sequential composition [13].
Theorem 1 (Sequential Composition). If M1 and
M2 are (1, δ1)-DP and (2, δ2)-DP algorithms that use inde-
pendent randomness, then releasing the outputs M1(D) and
M2(D) on database D satisfies (1 + 2, δ1 + δ2)-DP.
There exist advanced composition theorems that give tighter
bounds on privacy loss under certain conditions [14], but we
use sequential composition as defined above as it is general
and easy to compute.
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Our goal is to build a system that permits efficient query
answering on private data federations while achieving prov-
able guarantees on the information disclosed to the clients
as well as the data owners. As discussed in Section 1, prior
work can be divided into two classes: (i) systems that use
secure computation to answer queries, which give formal
privacy guarantees but suffer 4–6 orders of magnitude slow-
downs compared to non-private data federations [4, 56],
and (ii) systems that use secure hardware [54, 56] or prop-
erty preserving encryption [45], which are practical in terms
of performance, but have no formal guarantee on the privacy
afforded to clients and data owners.
While secure computation based solutions are attractive,
and there is much recent work in improving their efficiency [6,
24, 25], secure computation solutions fundamentally limit
performance due to several factors: 1) a worst-case running
time is necessary to avoid leaking information from early
termination; 2) computation must be oblivious, i.e., the pro-
gram counters and the memory traces must be independent
of the input; 3) cryptographic keys must be sent and com-
puted on by data owners, the cost of which scales with the
complexity of the program.
In particular, applying secure computation protocols to
execute SQL queries results in extremely slow performance.
A SQL query is a directed acyclic graph of database opera-
tors. Each operator within the tree takes an input, applies
a function, and outputs its result to the next operator. The
execution time needed to calculate each intermediate result
and the array size required to hold that result leaks infor-
mation about the underlying data. To address this leakage,
private data federations must insert dummy tuples to pad
intermediate results to their maximum possible size and en-
sure that execution time is independent of the input data.
We demonstrate this property in the following example.
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DISTINCT
./pid
demographic./code
σdiag=hd σmed=aspirin
diagnosis medication
[n3]
[n3]
[n2] [n]
[n] [n]
[n][n]
SELECT DISTINCT pid
FROM demographic de, diagnosis di
medication m
WHERE di.diag="hd" AND m.med = "aspirin"
AND di.code = m.code AND de.pid = m.pid
Figure 2: Exhaustive padding of intermediate results in an
oblivious query evaluation
Example 1. Figure 2 shows a SQL query and its corre-
sponding operator tree. Tuples flow from the source relations
through a filter operator, before entering two successive join
operators and ending at a distinct operator. In order to hide
the selectivity of each operator, the private data federation
pads each intermediate result to its maximum value. At the
filter operators, the results are padded as if no tuples were
filtered out, remaining at size n. This is a significant source
of additional computation. If the selectivity of the filter is
10−3, our padding gives a 1000× performance overhead. As
the tuples flow into the first join, which now receives two
inputs of size n, exhaustive padding produces an output of
n2 tuples. When this result passes through the next join, the
result size that the distinct operator must process jumps to
n3. If we once again assume a 10−3 selectivity at the joins,
we now see a 109× computation overhead. Such a significant
slowdown arises from the cumulative effect of protecting cas-
cading operators. By exhaustively padding operator outputs,
we see ever-increasing intermediate result cardinalities and,
as a function of that growth, ever-decreasing performance.
To tackle this fundamental performance challenge, we for-
malize our research problems as follows.
• Build a system that uses differentially private leakage of
intermediate results to speed up SQL query evaluation
while achieving all the privacy goals stated in Section 2.
• Given an SQL operator o and a privacy budget (, δ),
design an (, δ)-differentially private mechanism that ex-
ecutes the operator with a smaller performance overhead
compared to fully oblivious computation.
• Given a sequence of operators Q = {o1, . . . , ol}, design
an algorithm to optimally split the privacy budget (, δ)
among these operators during query execution.
In the following sections, we first present our system for
more efficient SQL query processing and its building blocks
including the differentially private mechanisms for each SQL
operator and the overall privacy analysis (Section 4), and
then present a budget splitting algorithm that optimizes the
performance (Section 5).
4. SHRINKWRAP
In this section, we present the end-to-end algorithm of
Shrinkwrap for answering a SQL query in a private data fed-
eration, the key differentially private mechanism for safely
revealing the intermediate cardinality of each operator, and
the overall privacy analysis of Shrinkwrap.
4.1 End-to-end Algorithm
At its core, Shrinkwrap is a system that applies differ-
ential privacy throughout SQL query execution to reduce
intermediate result sizes and improve performance. The pri-
vate data federation ingests a query q as a directed acyclic
graph (DAG) of database operators Q = {o1, . . . , ol}, fol-
lowing the order of a bottom up tree traversal. The query
coordinator decides the output policy based on the client
type and assigns the privacy parameters (, δ) for the corre-
sponding privacy goals. To improve performance, a privacy
budget of (1→l, δ1→l) will be spent on protecting intermedi-
ate cardinalities of the l operators. When client is allowed to
learn the true query output (output policy 1), then 1→l = 
and δ1→l = δ; when the client is allowed to learn noisy
query answers from a differentially private mechanism, then
1→l <  and δ1→l < δ, where the remaining privacy budget
(− 1→l, δ − δ1→l) will be spent on the query output.
Algorithm 1 outlines the end-to-end execution of a SQL
query in Shrinkwrap. Inputs to the algorithm are the query
Q, the overall privacy parameters (, δ), the privacy budget
for improving the performance (1→l, δ1→l), and the pub-
lic information K, including the relational database schema
and the maximum possible input data size at each party.
First, the query coordinator allocates the privacy budget
for improving performance (1→l, δ1→l) among the operators
in Q such that
l∑
i=1
i = 1→l and
l∑
i=1
δi = δ1→l (3)
where (i, δi) is the privacy budget allocated to operator
oi. If i = δi = 0, then the operator is evaluated oblivi-
ously (without revealing the intermediate result size). When
i, δi > 0, Shrinkwrap is allowed to reveal an overestimate of
the intermediate result size, with larger (i, δi) values giving
tighter intermediate result estimates. The performance im-
provement of Shrinkwrap highly depends on how the budget
is split among the operators, but any budget split that satis-
fies Equation 3 satisfies privacy. We show several allocation
strategies in Section 5 and analyze them in the evaluation.
Next, the query coordinator compiles a secure query plan
to be executed by the data owners. The secure query plan
traverses the operators in Q. For each operator oi, data
owners compute secret shares of the true output using secure
computation over the federated database and the output of
other operators computed from D. We denote this secure
computation for oi by SMC(oi, D). The true outputs (of
size ci) are placed into a secure array Oi. The secure array
is padded (with encrypted dummy values) so that its size
equals the maximum possible output size for operator oi.
Then, Shrinkwrap calls a (i, δi)-differentially private func-
tion Resize() to resize this secure array Oi to a smaller array
Si such that a subset of the (encrypted) dummy records are
removed. Resizing is described in Section 4.2. Once all the
operators are securely evaluated, if the output policy allows
release of true answers to the client (policy 1), the last secure
array Sl will be directly returned to the query coordinator;
otherwise, the data owners jointly and securely compute a
differentially private mechanism on Sl with the remaining
privacy budget (0 =  − 1→l, δ0 = δ − δ1→l), denoted
by M (0,δ0)(Sl), and return the output of M
(0,δ0)(Sl) to
the query coordinator. For instance, one could use Laplace
mechanism to perturb count queries using a multiparty pro-
tocol for generating noise as in [38]. Finally, the query co-
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Algorithm 1: End-to-end Shrinkwrap algorithm
Input: PDF query DAG with operators Q = {o1, . . . , ol},
the federated database D, public information K,
privacy parameters (, δ), privacy budget for
performance (1→l ≤ , δ1→l ≤ δ)
Output: Query output R
//Computed on query coordinator
P = {(1, δ1), . . . , (l, δl)|
∑l
i=1 i = 1→l,
∑l
i=1 δi = δ1→l}← AssignBudget(1→l, δ1→l, Q,K) // (Sec. 5)
//Computed on private data owners
for i← 1 to l do
(Oi, ci)← SMC(oi, D) //with exhaustive padding
Si ← Resize(Oi,ci,i,δi,∆ci) // DP resizing (Sec. 4.2)
end
if  = 1→l and δ = δ1→l then
Send query coordinator Sl //output policy 1
else
Query output budget 0 ← (− 1→l), δ0 ← (δ − δ1→l)
Send query coordinator M(0,δ0)(Sl) //output policy 2
end
//Computed on query coordinator
R← Assemble(Sl)
return R to client
function Resize(O, c, , δ, ∆c)
c˜← c+TLap(, δ, ∆c) // perturb cardinality
O ← Sort(O) //obliviously sort dummy tuples to the end
S ← new SecureArray(O[1, . . . , c˜])
return S
ordinator assembles the final secure array received from the
data owners Sl, decrypting the final result R and returning
it to the client.
4.2 DP Resizing Mechanism
For each operator oi, Shrinkwrap first computes the true
result using secure computation and places it into a exhaus-
tively padded secure array Oi. For example, as shown in
Figure 3, a join operator with two inputs, each of size n,
will have a secure array Oi of size n
2. This is the exhaustive
padding case shown on the left side of the figure, with the
private data federation inserting the materialized interme-
diate results into the secure array and padding those results
with dummy tuples. The Resize() function takes in the ex-
haustively padded secure array Oi, the true cardinality of
the output ci, the privacy parameters (i, δi), and the sen-
sitivity of the cardinality query at operator oi, denoted by
∆ci. The cardinality query ci(D) returns the output of the
operator oi in the PDF query q. The sensitivity of a query
is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Query Sensitivity). The sensitivity of
a function f : D → R∗ is the maximum difference in its out-
put for any pairs of neighboring databases D and D′,
∆f = max
{D,D′ s.t. |D−D′|∪|D′−D|=1}
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖1
Based on these inputs, the Resize() function runs a (i, δi)-
differentially private truncated Laplace mechanism (Def. 4)
to obtain a new, differentially private cardinality c˜i > ci for
the secure array. Next, this function sorts the exhaustively
padded secure array Oi obliviously such that all dummy
tuples are at the end of the array and then copies the first
c˜i tuples in the sorted array into a new secure array Si of
size c˜i. This new secure array Si of a smaller size than Oi
is used for the following computations.
Noise Generation: Shrinkwrap generates differentially pri-
vate cardinalities by using a truncated Laplace mechanism.
Given an operator o, with a privacy budget (, δ) and the
sensitivity parameter for the cardinality query ∆c, this mech-
anism computes a noisy cardinality for use in Algorithm 1.
Definition 4 (Truncated Laplace Mechanism).
Given a query c : D → N, the truncated Laplace mechanism
TLap(, δ,∆c) adds a non-negative integer noise max(η, 0)
to the true query answer c(D), where η ∈ Z follows a distri-
bution, denoted by L(, δ,∆c) that has a probability density
function Pr[η = x] = p · e−(/∆c)|x−η0|, where p = e/∆c−1
e/∆c+1
,
η0 = −∆c·ln((e
/∆c+1)δ)

+ ∆c.
This mechanism allows us to add non-negative integer noise
to the intermediate cardinality query which corresponding
to the number of the dummy records. The noise η drawn
from L(, δ,∆c) satisfies that Pr[η < ∆c] ≤ δ, which enables
us to show the privacy guarantee of this mechanism.
Theorem 2. The truncated Laplace mechanism satisfies
(, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. For any neighboring databases D1, D2, let c1 =
c(D1) ≥ 0 and c2 = c(D2) ≥ 0. W.L.O.G. we consider
c2 ≥ c1. It is easy to see that Pr[TLap(D1) ∈ (−∞, c1)] = 0
and Pr[TLap(D2) ∈ (−∞, c2)] = 0. By the noise property,
for any o ≥ c2 ≥ c1, it is true that | ln Pr[TLap(D2)=o]Pr[TLap(D1)=o] | ≤ .
However, when the output o ∈ [c1, c2), Pr[TLap(D2) =
o] = 0, but the Pr[TLap(D2) = o] > 0, making the ra-
tio of probabilities unbounded. Nevertheless, we can bound
Pr[TLap(D2) ∈ [c1, c2)] by δ as shown below.
Let O∗ = (−∞, c2). We can show that for any output set
O of query c(), we have
Pr[TLap(D1) ∈ O]
= Pr[TLap(D1) ∈ (O ∩O∗)] + Pr[TLap(D1) ∈ (O −O∗)]
≤ Pr[TLap(D1) ∈ [c1, c2)] + e Pr[TLap(D2) ∈ (O −O∗)]
= Pr[η1 < ∆c] + e
 Pr[TLap(D2) ∈ O]
= δ + e Pr[TLap(D2) ∈ O] (4)
Hence, this mechanism satisfies (, δ)-DP.
Sensitivity Computation: In order to create our noisy
cardinalities using the truncated Laplace mechanism in Defi-
nition 4, we must determine the cardinality query sensitivity
Without 
Shrinkwrap
With 
Shrinkwrap
n2= |R|･|S|
Exhaustive Padding
|R⋈S|
True Cardinality
Lap(𝜀,δ, Δc)
DP Noise
Dummy
Data
Dummy
Data
Real
Data
Real
Data
Figure 3: Effect of Shrinkwrap on Intermediate Result
Sizes When Joining Tables R and S
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at the output of each operator in the query tree. An interme-
diate result cardinality, ci, is the output size of the sub-query
tree rooted at operator oi. The sensitivity of ci depends on
the operators in its sub-query tree, and we compute this as
a function of the stability of operators in the sub-query tree.
The stability of an operator bounds the change in the output
with respect to the change in the input of the operator.
Definition 5 (Stability [36]). A transformation op-
erator is s-stable if for any two input data sets A and B,
|T (A)	 T (B)| ≤ s× |A	B|
For unary operators, such as SELECT, PROJECT, the sta-
bility usually equals one. For JOIN operators, a binary op-
erators, the stability is equal to the maximum multiplicity
of the input data. The sensitivity of the intermediate car-
dinality query ci can be recursively computed bottom up,
starting from a single change in the input of the leaf nodes.
Example 2. Given a query tree shown in Figure 4, the
bottom two filter operators each have a stability of one, giving
a sensitivity (∆c) of 1 at that point. Next, the first join has
a stability of m for the maximum input multiplicity, which
increases the overall sensitivity to m. The following join op-
erator also has a stability of m, which changes the sensitivity
to m2. Finally, the DISTINCT operator has a stability of 1,
so the overall sensitivity remains m2.
DISTINCT
[∆c5 = m
2]
./pid
[∆c4 = m
2]
demographics./pid
[∆c3 = m]
σdiag=hd
[∆c1 = 1]
σmed=aspirin
[∆c2 = 1]
diagnosis
medication
Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis for running example
Using these principles, Shrinkwrap calculates the sensitivity
for each operator in a query tree for use in Laplace noise
generation during query execution. More details can be seen
in PINQ [36] for computing the sensitivity of SQL queries.
Secure Array Operations: Note that each time Shrinkwrap
adds or removes tuples, it normally needs to pay an I/O
cost for accessing the secure array. We avoid paying the full
cost by carrying out a bulk unload and load. To start the
Resize() function, Shrinkwrap takes an intermediate result
secure array and sorts it so that all dummy tuples are at
the end of the secure array. Next, Shrinkwrap cuts off the
end of the original secure array and copies the rest into the
new, differentially-private sized secure array. Since the new
secure array has a size guaranteed to be larger than the true
cardinality, we know that cutting off the end will only re-
move dummy tuples. Thus, we avoid paying the full I/O
cost for each tuple. However, we do pay an O(n log(n)) cost
for the initial sorting, as well as an O(n) cost for bulk copy-
ing the tuples. This algorithm is an extension of the one
in [21] and variants of it are in [40, 41, 56].
4.3 Overall Privacy Analysis
Given a PDF query DAG q with operators {o1, . . . , ol} and
a privacy parameter (, δ), Algorithm 1 achieves the privacy
goals stated in Section 2.
Theorem 3. Under the assumptions described in Section 2,
Algorithm 1 achieves the privacy goals: data owners have a
(, δ)-computational differentially private view over the input
data of other data owners; when true answers are returned to
the client, the client learn nothing else; when noisy answers
are returned the client, the client has a (, δ)-computational
differentially private view over the input data of all the data
owners.
Proof. (sketch) We prove that the view of data own-
ers satisfies computational differential privacy [37, 48] by
showing that the view of any data owner is computationally
indistinguishable from its view in an ideal simulation that
outputs only the differentially private cardinalities of each
operator output.
Let Sim be a simulator that takes as input the horizontal
partitions held by the data owners (D1, ..., Dm), and out-
puts a vector S⊥i for operator oi such that: (a) |S⊥i | is drawn
from ci + TLap(), and (b) S
⊥
i contains encryptions of 0 (of
the appropriate arity). It is easy to see that function com-
puted by Sim satisfies (1→l, δ1→l)-DP: (a) at each operator,
the release of |S⊥i | satisfies (i, δi)-DP, and (b) By sequen-
tial composition (Theorem 1) and Equation 3, releasing all
the cardinalities satisfies (1→l, δ1→l)-DP. When the output
itself is differentially private, there is an additional privacy
loss to data owners (since the client could release the output
to the data owners), but the overall algorithm still satisfied
(, δ)-DP by sequential composition.
The real execution outputs secure arrays Si at each opera-
tor oi using secure computation. This ensures that the view
of a data owner in the real execution is computationally
indistinguishable from the execution of Sim, which satis-
fies (, δ)-DP. Thus, we can show that the view of any data
owner satisfies (, δ)-computational DP. The privacy guaran-
teed to the client and query coordinator can be analogously
argued.
4.4 Multiple SQL Queries
The privacy loss of Shrinkwrap due to answering multi-
ple queries is analyzed using sequential composition (Theo-
rem 1). There are two approaches to minimize privacy loss
across multiple queries: (i) applying advanced composition
theorems that give tighter bounds on privacy loss under cer-
tain conditions [14] or (ii) optimizing privacy budget alloca-
tion across the operators of a workload of predefined SQL
queries (e.g. using [35]). These two approaches are orthog-
onal to our work and adapting these ideas to the context of
secure computation is an interesting avenue for future work.
5. PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION
A key technical challenge is to divide the privacy budget
for performance (1→l, δ1→l) across the different operators
so the overall runtime of the query execution is minimized.
Problem 1. Given a privacy budget (1→l, δ1→l), a PDF
query DAG q with operators Q = {o1, . . . , ol}, and public in-
formation K which includes the sensitivities of the interme-
diate cardinality queries {∆c1, . . . ,∆cl}, the schema infor-
mation, compute the share (i, δi) assigned to oi such that:
(a) the assignment ensures privacy, i.e.,
∑l
i=1 i = 1→l,
and (b) the overall run time of the query is minimized.
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5.1 Baseline Privacy Budget Allocation
We first consider two baseline strategies for allocating the
privacy budget to individual operators.
Eager: This approach allocates the entire budget (1→l, δ1→l)
to the first operator in the query tree. In Figure 2, this
equates to minimizing the output cardinality of the filter on
diagnoses and executing the rest of the tree obliviously. A
benefit of this approach is that since the intermediate results
of the first operator flow through the rest of the tree, every
operator will see the benefit of minimizing the output cardi-
nality. On the other hand, in some trees, certain operators,
like joins, have an output-sized effect on the total query
performance. Not allocating any privacy budget to those
operators results in a missed optimization opportunity.
Uniform: The second approach splits the privacy budget
(1→l, δ1→l) uniformly across the query tree, resulting in
equal privacy parameters for each operator. The benefit
here is that every single operator receives part of the bud-
get, so we do not lose out on performance gains from any
operator. The drawback of the uniform approach, like the
one-time approach, is that some operators produce larger
effects, so by not allocating more of the budget to them, we
lose out on potential performance gains.
5.2 Optimal Privacy Budget Allocation
We design a third approach which uses an execution cost
model as an objective function and applies convex optimiza-
tion to determine the optimal budget splitting strategy.
Cost Model: The execution cost of a query in Algorithm 1
mainly consists of (a) the cost for securely computing each
operator and (b) the I/O cost of handling each intermedi-
ate result by Shrinkwrap. We model these cost as functions
of the corresponding input data sizes and output data size.
The cost of secure computation at operator oi is represented
by a function costoi(Ni), where Ni be the set of the cardi-
nalities of the input tables. The I/O cost of handling each
intermediate result of operator oi by Shrinkwrap is mainly
the cost to sort the exhaustively padded array of size n′ and
the cost of copying the array of size n to the new array of size
n′, denote by costsort(n) and costcopy(n, n′) respectively. In
particular, the size of the exhaustively padded array also
depends on the sizes of the input tables, represented by a
function oi(Ni). Most of the time, the size of the exhaus-
tively padded array is the product of the input table sizes.
For example, if operator oi takes one input table of size n1,
then oi(N = {n1}) = n1; if operator oi takes two input ta-
bles of size n1 and n2, then oi(N = {n1, n2}) = n1 ·n2. The
number of tuples n′ copied to the new array depends on the
noisy output size ni.
The input tables to an operator can be a mix of base ta-
bles and the intermediate output tables. Given a database of
k relations (R1, . . . , Rk), there will be an additional l num-
ber of intermediate output tables generated in a query tree
of l operators. The public knowledge K contains the ta-
ble sizes for the original tables, but the output cardinalities
of the operators are unknown. In the private setting, we
cannot use the true cardinality for the estimation. Instead,
Shrinkwrap uses the naive reduction factors from [47] to
estimate the output cardinality of each operator, denoted
by estimate(ci,K). The noise ηi added to the cardinality
depends on the noise distribution of the truncated Laplace
mechanism and we use the expectation of the distribution
TLap(i, δi,∆ci) to model the noise. Putting this together,
the output cardinality ni at operator oi is estimated by
estimate(ci,K) + E(TLap(i, δi,∆ci)).
Based on this formulation, the cost of assigning privacy
budget P = {(i, δi)|i = 1, . . . , l} to operatorsQ = {o1, . . . , ol}
in the query tree is modeled as
C(P,K) =
l∑
i=1
costoi(Ni)+costsort(oi(Ni))+costcopy(oi(Ni), ni)
(5)
where ni = estimate(ci,K) + E(TLap(i, δi,∆qi)).
Optimization: Using this cost model, we find the optimal
solution to the following problem as the budget allocation
strategy for Algorithm 1.
minP C(P ) s.t.
l∑
i=1
i ≤ 1→l,
l∑
i=1
δi ≤ δ1→l,
i, δi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . l (6)
We show the detailed cost model including the unit cost
function costoi(Ni, ni), costsort(oi(Ni)), and costcopy(oi(Ni), ni)
for two different secure computation protocols in the next
section. Using a convex optimization solver, we determine
the optimal budget split that minimizes the cost objective
function. We evaluate how it performs against the baseline
approaches in Section 7.
6. PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION
Shrinkwrap is a flexible computation layer that supports a
wide range of private data federations and database engines.
The only requirements are that the private data federation
process queries as operator trees and that the underlying
database engine supports SQL queries. Shrinkwrap imple-
ments a wide range of SQL operators for PDF queries, in-
cluding selection, projection, aggregation, limit, and some
window aggregates. For joins, we handle equi-joins and cross
products. At this time we do not support outer joins or set
operations. For output policy 2 where client sees noisy an-
swers released from differentially private mechanisms, we
support aggregate queries like COUNT for the final data oper-
ator.
The fundamental design pattern of secure computation
protocols is the circuit model, where functions are repre-
sented as circuits, i.e. a collection of topologically ordered
gates. The benefit of this model is that by describing how
to securely compute a single gate, we can compose the com-
putation across all gates to evaluate any circuit, simplifying
the design of the protocol. The downside is that circuits
are difficult for programmers to reason about. Instead, the
von Neumann-style Random Access Machine (RAM) model
handles the impedance mismatch between programmers and
circuits by creating data structures, such as ORAM, that
utilize circuit-based oblivious algorithms for I/O. With the
RAM model, programmers no longer have to write programs
as circuits. Instead, they can think of their data as residing
in secure arrays that can be plugged into their existing code.
The downside of the RAM model is that since the data struc-
tures are more general purpose, performance lags behind di-
rect circuit model implementations of the same function. In
this work, we use Shrinkwrap with both RAM model and
circuit model protocols, providing a general framework that
can easily add new protocols to the query executor.
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6.1 RAMModel
When integrating a new protocol, we first create an op-
erator cost model that captures the execution cost of each
operator. For a RAM based protocol, we model the cost of
secure computations costo(N) for commonly used relational
operators in Table 2, where N is the set of cardinalities of
input tables of operator o. The cost function considered in
this work focuses on the I/O cost of each relational operator
in terms of reads and writes from a secure array.
We let cread(n) and cwrite(n) be the unit cost for reading
and writing of a tuple from a secure array of size n respec-
tively. Secure arrays protect their contents from attackers by
guaranteeing that all reads or writes access the same num-
ber of memory locations. Typically, the data structures will
shuffle either their entire contents or their access path on
each access, with different implementations providing per-
formance ranging from O(logn) to O(n log(n)2) per read or
write [2, 53]. This variable I/O cost guarantees that an ob-
server cannot look at memory access time or program traces
to infer sensitive information.
Given the unit cost for reading and writing, we can rep-
resent the cost of secure computation for each operator as
the sum of reading cost and writing cost. For example, the
cost function for a Filter operator costFilter(N = {n1}) is
the cost of reading n1 number of input records and writ-
ing n1 number of output records. For a Join operator over
two input tables, the cost function costJoin(N = {n1, n2})
equals to the sum of n1 number of records reading from the
first secure array of size n1, (n1 ∗n2) number of record read-
ing from the second array of size n2, and (n1 ∗ n2) number
of record writes, i.e. n1 ∗ cread(n1) + n1 ∗ n2 ∗ cread(n2) +
n1 ∗ n2 ∗ cwrite(n1 ∗ n2). The other operators are modeled
similarly in Table 2. The cost function for copying from
an array of size n to an array of size n′ can be modeled as
costcopy(n, n
′) = n′ ∗ cread(n) + n′ ∗ cwrite(n′).
In this work, we use ObliVM [32] to implement our RAM
based relational operators, under a SMCQL [4] private data
federation design. We chose ObliVM due to its compiler,
which allows SMCQL to easily convert operators written as
C-style code into secure computation programs. However,
Shrinkwrap can support more recent ORAM implementa-
tions such as DORAM [12] by summarizing their cost behav-
ior as in Table 2 and using those operator costs in our cost
model. In SMCQL, private intermediate results are held in
secure arrays, i.e., oblivious RAM (ORAM), and operators
are compiled as circuits that receive an ORAM as input,
evaluate the operator, and output the result ORAM to the
next operator. With Shrinkwrap, we resize the intermedi-
ate ORAM arrays passed between operators by obliviously
eliminating excess dummy tuples, reducing the intermediate
cardinalities of our results and improving performance. Any
ORAM implementation is compatible with Shrinkwrap, as
long as its I/O characteristics can be similarly defined as in
Table 2.
6.2 Circuit Model
Alternatively, if a private data federation uses a circuit
based protocol to express database operators, we can esti-
mate the cost of an operator o, costo(N), with ngates gates
in its circuit, a maximum circuit depth of dcircuit, nin ele-
ments of input, and an output size of nout as:
costop(N) = cin ∗nin+ cg ∗ngates+ cd ∗dcircuit+ cout ∗nout,
Operator costo(N = {n1, n2, . . .})
Filter n1 ∗ cread(n1) + n1 ∗ cwrite(n1)
Join n1 ∗ cread(n1) + n1 ∗ n2 ∗ cread(n2)
+n1 ∗ n2 ∗ cwrite(n1 ∗ n2)
Aggregate n1 ∗ cread(n1) + cwrite(n1)
Aggregate, Group By n1 ∗ cread(n1) + n1 ∗ cwrite(n1)
Window Aggregate n1 ∗ cread(n1) + n1 ∗ cwrite(n1)
Distinct n1 ∗ cread(n1) + n1 ∗ cwrite(n1)
Sort n1 ∗ log2(n1) ∗ (cread(n1) + cwrite(n1))
Table 2: Operator I/O cost
where cin and cout account for the encoding and decoding
costs needed for a given protocol, cg and cd account for the
costs due to the gate count and circuit depth respectively,
the number of input element is nin =
∑
nj∈N nj and the
number of output element is nout =
∏
nj∈N nj .
The generic nature of this model allows us to capture the
performance features of all circuit-based secure computa-
tion protocols. For example, in this work we utilize EMP
toolkit [51], a state of the art circuit protocol, in conjunc-
tion with Shrinkwrap. As EMP has not been used in private
data federations, we implemented EMP with SMCQL. In-
stead of compiling operators into individual circuits, EMP
compiles a SQL query into a single circuit, though it still
pads intermediate results within the circuit. In this setting,
we can still apply Shrinkwrap as we did in the RAM model,
where we minimize the padding according to our differential
privacy guarantees. Instead of modifying the ORAM, we
directly modify the circuit to eliminate dummy tuples.
For both our RAM model and our circuit model imple-
mentations, Shrinkwrap uses a cost model to estimate the
execution cost of intermediate result padding. With the
model, we can carry out our privacy budget optimization
and allocation as seen in Section 5. Shrinkwrap’s protocol
agnostic design allows it to optimize the performance of se-
cure computation, regardless of the implementation.
6.3 M-Party Support
In this work, we implement Shrinkwrap using two party
secure computation protocols, meaning that we run our ex-
periments over two data owners. However, Shrinkwrap sup-
ports additional data owners. By leveraging the associativ-
ity of our operators, we can convert all m party computa-
tions into a series of binary computations. For example,
assume we want to join to tables R and S, which are hor-
izontally partitioned across 3 data owners as R1, R2, R3,
and S1, S2, S3. We can join across the 3 data owners as:
(R1 ./ S1) ∪ (R1 ./ S2) ∪ (R3 ./ S3) ∪ (R2 ./ S1) ∪ (R2 ./
S2)∪ (R2 ./ S3)∪ (R3 ./ S1)∪ (R3 ./ S2)∪ (R3 ./ S3). We
can execute this series of binary joins using two party secure
computation then union the results. With this construction,
we can scale Shrinkwrap out to any number of parties. How-
ever, this algorithm is not efficient due to naively carrying
out m2 secure computation operations for every m parties
we compute over. We can use m party secure computation
protocols [3, 5, 20], which have fewer high-level operators
and made large performance strides, but these protocols are
still expensive. We leave performance improvements in this
setting for future work.
7. RESULTS
We now look at Shrinkwrap performance using both real
world and synthetic datasets and workloads. First, we cover
8
Name Query
Dosage Study SELECT DISTINCT d.pid FROM diagnoses d, medications m WHERE d.pid = m.pid AND medication = ’aspirin’ AND
icd9 = ’circulatory disorder’ AND dosage = ’325mg’
Comorbidity SELECT diag, COUNT(*) cnt FROM diagnoses WHERE pid ∈ cdiff cohort ∧ diag <> ’cdiff’ ORDER BY cnt DESC LIMIT 10;
Aspirin SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT pid) FROM diagnosis d JOIN medication m on d.pid = m.pid
Count JOIN demographics demo on d.pid = demo.pid WHERE d.diag = ’heart disease’ AND m.med = ’aspirin’ AND d.time <= m.time;
3-Join SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT pid) FROM diagnosis d JOIN medication m on d.pid = m.pid
JOIN demographics demo on d.pid = demo.pid JOIN demographics demo2 ON d.pid = demo2.pid
WHERE d.diag = ’heart disease’ AND m.med = ’aspirin’ AND d.time <= m.time;
Table 3: HealthLNK query workload.
our experimental design and setup. Next, we evaluate the
end to end performance of our system and show the per-
formance vs privacy trade-off under both true and differ-
entially private answer settings. Then, we look at how
Shrinkwrap performs at the operator level and the accuracy
of our cost model, followed by a discussion of our budget
splitting strategies. Finally, we examine how Shrinkwrap
scales to larger datasets and more complex queries.
7.1 Experimental Setup
For this work, we implemented Shrinkwrap on top of an
existing healthcare database federation that uses SMCQL [4]
for secure computation. This private data federation serves
a group of hospitals that wish to mine the union of their
electronic health record systems for research while keeping
individual tuples private.
A clinical data research network or CDRN is a consortium
of healthcare sites that agree to share their data for research.
CDRN data providers wish to keep their data private. We
examine this work in the context of HealthLNK [44], a CDRN
prototype for Chicago-area healthcare sites. This repository
contains records from seven Chicago-area healthcare insti-
tutions, each with their own member hospitals, from 2006
to 2012, totaling about 6 million records. The data set is
selected from a diverse set of hospitals, including academic
medical centers, large county hospitals, and local commu-
nity health centers.
Medical researchers working on HealthLNK develop SQL
queries and run them on data from a set of healthcare sites.
These researchers are the clients of the private data federa-
tion and the healthcare sites are the private data owners.
Dataset: We evaluate Shrinkwrap on medical data from
two Chicago area hospitals in the HealthLNK data repos-
itory [44] over one year of data. This dataset has 500,000
patient records, or 15 GB of data. For additional evalua-
tion, we generate synthetic data up to 750 GB based on this
source medical data. To simplify our experiments, we use a
public patient registry for common diseases that maintains
a list of anonymized patient identifiers associated with these
conditions. We filter our query inputs using this registry.
Query Workload: For our experiments, we chose three
representative queries based on clinical data research proto-
cols [23, 43] and evaluate Shrinkwrap on this workload us-
ing de-identified medical records from the HealthLNK data
repository. We also generate synthetic versions of Aspirin
Count that contain additional join operators. We refer to
these queries by the number of join operators, e.g., 3-Join
for 3 join operators. The queries are shown in Table 3.
Configuration: Shrinkwrap query processing runs on top
of PostgreSQL 9.5 running on Ubuntu Linux. We evalu-
ated our two-party prototype on 6 servers running in pairs.
The servers each have 64 GB of memory, 7200 RPM NL-
SAS hard drives, and are on a dedicated 10Gb/s network.
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Figure 5: End-to-End Shrinkwrap Performance for All
Queries at  = 0.5, δ = .00005.
Our results report the average runtime of three runs per ex-
periment. We implement Shrinkwrap under both the RAM
model (using ObliVM [33]) and circuit model (using EMP[51]).
For most experiments, we show results using the RAM model,
though corresponding circuit model results are similar. Un-
less otherwise specified, the results show the end-to-end run-
time of a query with output policy 1, i.e., true results.
7.2 End-to-end Performance
In our first experiment, we look at the the end to end per-
formance of Shrinkwrap compared to baseline private data
federation execution. For execution, we set  to 0.5, δ to
0.00005, and use the optimal budget splitting approach.
In Figure 5, we look at the overall performance of four
queries under Shrinkwrap for both RAM model and circuit
model secure computation. For Comorbidity, the execution
does not contain any join operators, meaning that there is no
explosion in intermediate result cardinality, so Shrinkwrap
provides fewer benefits. Dosage Study contains a join op-
erator with a parent distinct operator. Applying differen-
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Figure 6: Privacy, Performance, and Accuracy Tradeoffs.
Computed using different levels of privacy budget for per-
formance 1→l ∈ {0.1, ..., 1.5}. Executed using RAM Model,
3-Join,  = 1.5, δ = 0.00005.
tial privacy to the output of the join improves performance
by close to 5x under the RAM model, but sees fewer ben-
efits under the circuit model. Aspirin Count contains two
joins and sees an order of magnitude improvement under the
RAM model and a 2x improvement under the circuit model.
Finally, 3-Join has an enormous cardinality blow-up, allow-
ing Shrinkwrap to improve its performance by 33x under the
RAM model and 35x under the circuit model. In Section 7.6,
we examine this effect of join operators on performance. Al-
though implementation in the circuit model outperforms the
RAM model by an order of magnitude, Shrinkwrap gives
similar efficiency improvements in both systems.
7.3 Privacy, Performance, and Accuracy
We consider the performance vs privacy trade-off provided
by Shrinkwrap and evaluate the effect of the execution pri-
vacy budget on query performance. For this experiment, we
use the 3-Join query with the optimal budget splitting ap-
proach, fix the total privacy budget  = 1.5 and δ = 0.00005,
and use output setting 2, i.e. differentially private final an-
swers. We vary the privacy budget for performance δ1−l
from 0.1 to 1.5 and fix δ1→l = δ. The remaining privacy
budget − 1→l is spent on the query output using Laplace
mechanism.
In Figure 6a, we see the execution time as a function of
the privacy budget for performance (1→l). As the privacy
budget for performance 1→l increases, the execution time
decreases. A lower budget means that more noise must be
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Figure 7: Shrinkwrap execution speedup over baseline us-
ing different budget strategies. Executed using RAM model,
 = 0.5, δ = .00005
present in the intermediate result cardinalities, which trans-
lates to larger cardinalities and higher execution time vari-
ance. We know that I/O cost dominates the Shrinkwrap
cost model, so larger cardinalities mean more I/O accesses,
which causes lower performance.
In Figure 6b, we show the accuracy versus privacy trade-
off by varying the privacy budget for performance 1→l. We
report the execution time and the error introduced to the
final query answer at various privacy budget for performance
1→l < 1.5. Out of a total possible output size of 5500 tuples,
the query output is 10/5500 = 0.18% of the total possible
output size. If we allow additive noise of 0.36% (20/5500),
we get a 100x performance improvement. Since the total
privacy  is fixed, the more we spend for performance (larger
1→l), the less privacy budget we have at the output, i.e., as
our execution time improves, our output noise increases.
7.4 Evaluating Budget Splitting Strategies
We first examine the relative performance of the three
budget splitting strategies introduced in Section 6: uni-
form, eager, and optimal. Recall that uniform splits the
budget evenly across all the operators, eager inserts the en-
tire budget at the first operator, and uses the Shrinkwrap
cost model, along with cardinality estimates, to identify an
optimal budget split. We also include an oracle approach
that shows the performance of Shrinkwrap if true cardinal-
ities are used in the cost model to split the budget instead
of cardinality estimates. Note that oracle does not satisfy
differential privacy, but gives an upper bound on the best
performance achievable through privacy budgeting. For this
experiment, we use the Aspirin Count and 3-Join queries
since they contain multiple operators where Shrinkwrap gen-
erates differentially-private cardinalities and set the privacy
parameters usable during execution to  = 0.5 and δ =
.00005.
Figure 7 displays the relative speedup of all three ap-
proaches and the oracle for both queries over the baseline,
fully padded, private data federation execution. All three
Shrinkwrap approaches provide significant performance im-
provements, ranging from 3x to 33x. As expected, opti-
mal performs best for both queries. We also see that eager
performs better for Aspirin Count, while uniform performs
better for 3-Join.
The benefits of minimized intermediate result cardinali-
ties cascades as those results flow through the operator tree.
By using the entire budget on the first join operator in As-
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Figure 8: Per operator performance using different budget
strategies. Executed using Aspirin Count, RAM model,  =
0.5, δ = .00005
pirin Count, the eager approach maximizes the effect of the
intermediate result cardinality reduction, and as a result,
outperforms the uniform approach. However, for the 3-Join
query, the presence of the additional join operator overrides
the cascading cardinality benefit of the first join operator.
The uniform approach outperforms the eager approach by
ensuring that all three of the join operators receive differ-
entially private cardinalities. The optimal approach outper-
forms both eager and uniform by combining the best of both
worlds. Optimal applies differential privacy to all operators,
like uniform, but it uses a larger fraction of the budget on
earlier operators, like eager.
Looking at the oracle approach, we can evaluate the accu-
racy of our cost model. For privacy reasons, our cost model
does not use the true cardinalities. Here, we see that the
optimal approach, which uses estimated cardinalities, and
the oracle approach, which uses true cardinalities, provide
similar performance. In experiments using Aspirin Count,
we calculate the correlation coefficient between the true ex-
ecution time and the estimated execution time based on our
cost model as .998 for the circuit model and .931 for the
RAM model, given a  = 0.5, δ = .00005. We see that
the Shrinkwrap cost model provides a reasonably accurate
prediction of the true cost.
7.5 Operator Breakdown
Now, we look at the execution time by operator to see
where Shrinkwrap provides the largest impact. We include
only private operators in the figure. For this experiment we
use the Aspirin Count query with  = 0.5 and δ = 0.00005.
We show the execution times for the baseline, fully padded
approach for intermediate results, as well as the uniform,
eager, and optimal budget splitting approaches.
Figure 8 shows the execution times of each operator in the
Aspirin Count query. Note that Shrinkwrap does not apply
any differential privacy until the output of Join M. (Join on
Medications), so we see no speed-up in the actual Join M.
operator, only in the later query operators.
The first operator to see a benefit from Shrinkwrap is
Join D. (Join on Demographics), the second join in the
query. Shrinkwrap generates a differentially private car-
dinality for the output of the previous join, Join M., ac-
cording to the selected budget splitting approach. For uni-
form, the allocated budget is not large enough to generate
a differentially-private cardinality that is smaller than the
fully padded cardinality. In fact, the overhead of calculat-
ing the differentially-private cardinality actually causes the
operator runtime to go above the baseline runtime. For ea-
ger, Shrinkwrap spends the entire budget on the output of
the first join and reduces the intermediate cardinality by
an order of magnitude. The optimal approach uses enough
budget to reduce the intermediate cardinality, but not as
much as eager.
The next operator, DISTINCT, also sees a large perfor-
mance benefit. All three budget splitting approaches reduce
the runtime for DISTINCT by about an order of magnitude.
Since the baseline intermediate cardinality for DISTINCT is
much larger, the uniform approach generates a differentially-
private cardinality that reduces the intermediate result size
and improves performance. The eager approach does not
have any additional budget to use, but the effect of the pre-
vious intermediate cardinality cascades through the query
tree and reduces the execution time for DISTINCT as well.
Finally, the optimal approach applies its remaining budget
to see a significant performance improvement.
In the Aspirin Count query, the three budget splitting ap-
proaches allocate the budget between three operators and
provide an insight into the trade-off between early and late
budget allocation. We see wildly varying execution times for
each of the operators, with different operators providing the
bulk of the performance cost depending on the budget strat-
egy. Here, the optimal strategy gives the best performance.
The substantial variance in execution for these operators
demonstrates the value of the added accuracy that our I/O
cost model provides.
7.6 Join Scale Up
We now look at how Shrinkwrap scales with more com-
plex workloads. From our experiments, we know that the
number of joins in a query has an extremely large impact on
execution time. More complex workloads typically contain
more nested statements and require more advanced SQL
processing, but can be broken down into a series of simpler
statements. This work focuses on complexity as a function
of the join count in order to target the largest performance
bottleneck in a single SQL statement.
In our experiment, we scale the join count and measure the
performance. Since Shrinkwrap applies differential privacy
at the operator outputs, we measure the performance impact
of join operators by looking at the execution time of their
immediate parent operator. For consistency, we truncate the
number of non-inherited input tuples of each join to equal
magnitudes and use  = 0.5 and δ = 0.00005 for all runs.
From Figure 9, we see how execution time scales as a
function of the join count. As the number of joins increases,
the execution time also increases. To find the source of the
performance slowdown, we can look at the Shrinkwrap cost
model. For each join operator, the baseline private data fed-
eration fully pads the output. If the join inputs were both
of size n, then the output would be n2. As the number of
joins increase, the cardinality rises from n to n2 to n3. The
exponential increase in output cardinality requires signifi-
cantly more I/O accesses, which cause the large slow down
in performance. Shrinkwrap applies differential privacy to
reduce the output size at each join, reducing the magnitude
of each join output. While Shrinkwrap still sees a significant
growth in execution time as a function of the join count, the
overall performance is orders of magnitudes better.
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7.7 Data Size Scale Up
We evaluate the performance of Shrinkwrap with increas-
ing data sizes. We leverage the higher efficiency of our
circuit model protocol, EMP [51], to examine the effect of
Shrinkwrap on larger input data sizes. Without Shrinkwrap,
the RAM model protocol, ObliVM [33], needs 1.3 hours to
run the Aspirin Count query and at 50x, 65 hours to com-
plete. Instead, we use EMP which completes in 15 minutes.
Figure 10 shows the execution time both with and without
Shrinkwrap. We used a limited implementation of EMP [51]
and our Aspirin Count reference query. We generated syn-
thetic data that duplicates the original tables up to 50 times
the original 15 GB data size, giving us a maximum effective
data size of 750 GB. With Figure 10, we see that Shrinkwrap
still provides a significant improvement during execution.
As the data size grows, our performance improvement grows
as well, reflecting both the power and flexibility of Shrinkwrap.
8. RELATEDWORK
Within the literature, different approaches exist to im-
prove query processing in private data federations, such as
databases based on homomorphic encryption, TEEs, differ-
ential privacy, and cloud computation [1, 29, 30, 36, 45, 54].
Shrinkwrap, on the other hand, provides general-purpose,
hardware-agnostic, in-situ SQL evaluation with provable pri-
vacy guarantees and exact results.
PINQ [36] introduced the first database with differen-
tial privacy, along with privacy budget tracking and sen-
sitivity analysis for operator composition. We extend this
work by applying its privacy calculus to private data fed-
erations. Follow on work in differential privacy appears in
DJoin [38], where the system supports private execution of
certain SQL operators over a federated database with strong
privacy guarantees and noisy results. Shrinkwrap supports
a larger set of database operators for execution and instead
of using noisy results to safeguard data, Shrinkwrap uses
noisy cardinalities to improve performance.
He et al. [22] applied computational differential privacy
in join operators for private record linkage and proposed a
three desiderata approach to operator execution: precision,
provability, and performance. Shrinkwrap incorporates this
style of join execution and approach to execution trade-offs.
Pappas et al. [42] showed that by trading small bits of pri-
vacy for performance within provable bounds using bloom
filters, systems can provide scalable DBMS queries over ar-
bitrary boolean queries. Shrinkwrap applies this pattern of
provable privacy versus performance trade-offs to the larger
set of non-boolean arbitrary SQL queries.
Both Opaque [56] and Hermetic [54] use cost models to
estimate performance slowdowns due to privacy-preserving
computation. In both cases, they use secure enclaves to
carry out private computation, which provides constant-
cost I/O. As such, their cost models cannot account for the
variable-cost I/O present in Shrinkwrap.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we introduced Shrinkwrap, a protocol-agnostic
system for differentially-private query processing that sig-
nificantly improves the performance of private data federa-
tions. We use a computational differential privacy mecha-
nism to selectively leak statistical information within prov-
able privacy bounds and reduce the size of intermediates.
We introduce a novel cost model and privacy budget opti-
mizer to maximize the privacy, performance, and accuracy
trade-off. We integrate Shrinkwrap into existing private
data federation architecture and collect results using real-
world medical data.
In future research, we hope to further improve the per-
formance of private data federations and the efficiency of
Shrinkwrap. We are currently investigating novel secure ar-
ray algorithms and data structures to improve I/O access
time, privacy budget optimizations over multiple queries,
and extensions of private data federations using additional
secure computation protocols and cryptographic primitives.
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